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NOTES
EMOTIONAL STRESS-NOW A CAUSE OF COMPENSABLE INJURY?

No problem in recent years has given courts and commissions
administrating workmen's compensation more difficulty than the one
presented where an employee experiences an emotional shock or
strain in the course of his employment resulting in a physical collapse.' In 1963, the Louisiana supreme court in Danziger v. Employers Mutual Insurance Co. ' held that such an employee would not be
entitled to compensation benefits. It was reasoned that a disability
due to emotional stress did not fall within the definition of "accident"' and "injury"' in the Workmen's Compensation Act. However,
in 1972 the Louisiana supreme court in Ferguson v. HDE, Inc.) overruled Danziger and granted compensation in a case where an employee suffered a cerebral hemorrhage after an argument with his
employer over his paycheck. Although the court in Danziger had held
that there was no "accident" under the Workmen's Compensation
Act without a physical blow or stress,' in Ferguson the court dispensed with this requirement as a prerequisite to recovery.' Rather,
all that is needed is an event that results in injury to a worker that
is sufficiently related to the employment such that the event may be
said to "arise out of" and occur in the "course of the employment."
1. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963 Term-Workmen's Compensation, 24 LA. L. Rv. 244, 247-48 (1964).
2. 245 La. 33, 156 So. 2d 468 (1963).
3. LA. R.S. 23:1021(1) (1950): "'Accident' means an unexpected or unforseen
event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault and producing at
the time objective symptoms of an injury."
4. LA. R.S. 23:1021(7) (1950): "'Injury' and 'Personal Injuries' includes only injuries by violence to the physical structure of the body and such disease or infections as
naturally result therefrom. These terms shall in no case be construed to include any
other form of disease or derangement, howsoever caused or contracted."
5. 270 So. 2d 867 (La. 1972).
6. An early case, Johnson v.Zurich General Accident & Liability Insurance Co.,
161 So. 667, 668 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935), granted compensation to a nightwatchman
so frightened by a practical joke that he died of heart failure. The court found that
death was due to an accident "as if actual force had been used." Since the case
involved both physical contact and emotional stress, Louisiana law on emotional stress
was unclear until Danziger and Ferguson.
7. "Although he received no blow or trauma, and although he was not injured
because of physical stress or strain, the medical testimony is clear that he suffered
'violence to the physical structure of the body,' without which he would not have been
paralyzed." Ferguson v. HDE, Inc., 270 So. 2d 867, 869 (La. 1972).
8. LA. R.S. 23:1031 (1950).
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The necessity for a physical blow or force to fulfill the "accident"
requirement present in most workmen's compensation statutes has
been used in many jurisdictions as a means of preventing compensation awards in cases of emotional stress." This is particularly true in
those cases in which the disability was not to any substantial degree
employment-oriented."' Courts had stressed the necessity of establishing an external event or occurrence rather than a mere showing
that there was an unexpected change within the employee's body. 1
In England, where our workmen's compensation statutes originated,
"accident" has meant simply an accidental result; 2 thus, there is an
accident when a mishap results in an injury to the worker."1 The
Louisiana supreme court in Ferguson expressly adopted the British
meaning of "accident.""
Although Ferguson prevents the harshness of an automatik denial of compensation as in Danziger, it unfortunately gives little guidance in determining when a claimant suffers a compensable injury
resulting from emotional stress. The decision does, however, redefine
the term "accident," leaving only the determination of whether the
claimant's disability was caused by an event which "arises out of"
and occurs in the "course of the employment." In Seals v. City of
Baton Rouge,'" a pre-Danziger decision, the First Circuit Court of
Appeal does, however, give some guidance in this determination.
There the court denied compensation to a police captain who died of
a heart attack caused by mental worry over the probability of his
forced retirement due to poor health. Rather than base its denial on
a finding of no accident, the court held that "death caused from
agitation over retirement and occurring While on vacation [neither]
arises from performing services out of and incidental to his employment [nor] in the course of his employer's trade, business, or occupation." 6
Seals indicates that the correct analysis in these emotional stress
cases is whether the injury arises out of the employment situation.
This determination poses two basic questions. The first addresses
cause in fact; i.e., whether the stressful situation could have causally

9. Larson, The "Heart Cases" In Workmen's Compensation: An Analysis and
Suggested Solution, 65 MICH. L. REV. 441 (1967).
10. Id. at 468.
11. Id.at 444.
12. Id.;IA A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 38.10 (1967).
13. Larson, Range of Compensable Consequences in Workmen's Compensation,

21

HASTINGS

L.J. 609 (1970).

14. Ferguson v. HDE, Inc., 270 So. 2d 867, 869 (La. 1972).
15. 94 So. 2d 478 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
16. Id. at 485.
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contributed to the disability. 7 This involves the problem of medical
causation with its difficult evidentiary consequences. 8 The court
must decide if the employee's injury resulted from some employment
condition or the natural progression of a disease.
The second question is whether the causal part played by the
employment is sufficient to warrant a legal remedy. 9 An employee
has tensions and stress from all aspects of his life-family, financial
and social as well as from his employment.2" The problem is whether
the work tension caused the collapse or played only a minor part.
Furthermore, the employee may be unusually susceptible to emotional stress because of past maladjustments for which the employer
is not responsible." Finally, all persons have different tolerances to
emotional stress." The inquiry then is whether the employer should
be required to take his employee "as he finds him" as is done in cases
where physical stress causes disability."
There are sound reasons for granting compensation in these situations,2 particularly where the stressful situation producing injury is
clearly job connected. The necessary nexus with the employment is
perhaps easiest to find where a sudden emotional event precipitated
the injury. In these cases it is plain that the flash, noise, or argument
arose out of employment conditions and caused an emotional reaction
that resulted in disability.5 Employment connection is harder to find
where the disability results only from prolonged worry and anxiety.
These long term emotional reactions can produce damaging effects as
17. Larson, The "Heart Cases" In Workmen's Compensation: An Analysis and
Suggested Solution, 65 MICH. L. REV. 441, 474 (1967).
18. Id. at 442; see also The Work of the LouisianaAppellate Courts for the 19621963 Term-Workmen's Compensation, 24 LA. L. REV. 244, 248 (1964).
19. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963
Term-Workmen's Compensation, 24 LA. L. REV. 244, 248 (1964).
20. Id.; see W. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW & PRACTICE

§ 220 (Supp. 1964).
21. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963
Term-Workmen's Compensation, 24 LA. L. REV. 244, 248 (1964).
22. Id.; see also W. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW & PRACTICE
§ 220 (Supp. 1964).
23. See Behan v. John B. Honor Co., 143 La. 348, 78 So. 589 (1918); Howell v.
Clemons Bros. Lbr. Co., 32 So. 2d 60 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1947); Custer v. Higgins Ind.,
24 So. 2d 511 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946).
24. The most important reason for granting compensation in emotional stress
cases is the economic reality of a physically disabled member of society. Prior to his
injury, the employee was a contributing member of the work force. Instead of needing
to rely on charity, this man should receive compensation if his disability is workconnected.
25. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963
Term-Workmen's Compensation, 24 LA. L. REV. 244, 253-54 (1964).
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serious as emotions evoked by sudden events." The evidentiary burden of showing that worry and anxiety over one's employment caused
the injury is more difficult. This burden could be overcome, however,
by detailed evidence that the
claimant was continuously concerned
27
and dedicated to his work.
Two recent pre-Fergusoncourt of appeal cases, Hackett v. Travelers Insurance Co." and Johnson v. HartfordAccident and Indemnity Co., provide an opportunity to illustrate this "arising out of the
employment" analysis. In Hackett, the plaintiff suffered a traumatic
psychosis resulting from shock sustained while present at a dynamite
explosion that killed two men. In Johnson, the claimant suffered a
nervous breakdown from the prolonged pressures and anxiety of
working seven days a week as a traveling circulation representative
of a daily newspaper. Although in both cases the disability was
clearly employment related, compensation was automatically denied
due to the Danziger rule. Instead, under the suggested analysis, once
having found that the employment was a cause in fact of the injury,
then one must only determine if this causation was sufficiently substantial to allow recovery.
Compensation cannot be granted in every case where an employee is injured by emotional stress. To do so would make the employer an insurer of the employee, which. is not the purpose of the
Compensation Act.:" Professor Malone recommends that compensation be denied except in those cases where the nature of the job or
employment conditions play a dominant role in bringing about the
nervous tensions that cause the injury." He favors this approach over
the "precipitating factor" test used in physical stress cases where
employment conditions need only contribute in the slightest to the
disability. 2 This recommendation properly treats emotional stress
26. Page, Workman's Compensation Law-Reviews of Leading Current Cases, 28
NACCA L.J. 296, 309 (1961-62).
27. See Insurance Dept. v. Dinsmore, 233 Miss. 569, 102 So. 2d 691, aff'd on
rehearing, 233 Miss. 569, 104 So. 2d 296 (1958). An argument can also be made that
the employer benefits directly from the worry and anxiety of an employee who is a
perfectionist or who works harder than required. The employer enjoys the fruits of this
man's performance so he should be held to compensate the employee if job pressures,
executive worry, or prolonged periods of stress cause his breakdown.
28. 195 So. 2d 758 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
29. 196 So. 2d 635 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
30. Seals v. City of Baton Rouge, 94 So. 2d 478, 484 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
31. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963
Term-Workmen's Compensation, 24 LA. L. REV. 244, 249 (1964); see W. MALONE,
LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW & PRACTICE § 220 (Supp. 1964).
32. See Kern v. Southport Mill, 174 La. 432, 141 So. 19 (1932).
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cases as an "arising out of the employment" problem, and limits the
requirement that the employer take his employee "as he finds him.'":"
Applying this suggestion to Hackett and Johnson, the claimants
would thus have to prove that employment conditions were the
dominant force in producing the stress and anxiety which caused the
resulting injuries.:"
Each emotional stress case must be decided on its own particular
facts. The decision can best be made after a determination of
"[wihether there is a sufficient causal relation between the workconnected stressful situation and the emotional reaction, and be33. The

Work

of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963
LA. L. REV. 244, 249 (1964); see W. MALONE,

Term-Workmens Compensation, 24

LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW & PRACTICE

§ 220 (Supp. 1964).

34. Two other tests have been used principally by courts in New York in emotional
stress cases. The first is the requirement that the injury producing stress be greater
than the "wear and tear" of ordinary non-employment life. See, e.g., Mulholland v.
New York St. Dept of Pub. Wks., 34 App. Div. 2d 1083, 312 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1970);
Ferreri v. General Auto Dr. Sch., Inc., 26 App. Div. 2d 601, 271 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1966);
Larson, The "Heart Cases" In Workmen's Compensation:An Analysis and Suggested
Solution, 65 MIcH. L. REV. 441, 462 (1967). The other test is that the stress be greater
than that endured by other employees similarly situated. See also Master of Zygler v.
Tenzer Coat Co., 19 App. Div. 2d 660, 240 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1963), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 562,
254 N.Y.S.2d 537, 203 N.E.2d 217 (1964); Cramer v. Barney's Cloth. Store, 15 App.
Div. 2d 329, 223 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1962), aff'd, 13 N.Y.2d 711, 241 N.Y.S.2d 844, 191
N.E.2d 901 (1963).
The distinction between the two is clear in cases where the employee is engaged
in a dangerous occupation like a policeman. Many of the duties of a policeman involve
emotional stress greater than the "wear and tear" of ordinary life; but a high speed
chase for one officer is not unusual when compared to the work of other policemen.
See Eschenbrenner v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 165 Neb. 32, 84 N.W.2d 169 (1957).
The "other employee" test clearly places a greater burden on the claimant, particularly
those engaged in non-sedentary employment. One problem with both these tests is that
there is no way to measure the amount of emotional tension common to all jobs. See
Larson, The "Heart Cases" In Workmen's Compensation:An Analysis and Suggested
Solution, 65 MICH. L. REV. 441, 462 (1967). The principal reason for not using these
tests, however, is that they continue to approach emotional stress cases from the point
of view of trying to find an accidentally caused injury rather than as an "arising out
of the employment" problem.
A review of jurisprudence from other states with workmen's compensation statutes
that require an "accident" like Louisiana's reveals that no test is uniformly used in
deciding to grant or deny compensation. Some states still base a denial of compensation in emotional stress cases on a finding that no "accident" occurred. See, e.g.,
Whiting-Turner Cont. Co. v. McLaughlin, 11 Md. App. 360, 274 A.2d 390 (1971);
Weinstein v. Apex Dress Co., 25 N.Y.2d 947, 305 N.Y.S.2d 157, 252 N.E.2d 634 (1969);
Toth v. Standard Oil Co., 160 Ohio St. 1, 113 N.E.2d 81 (1953). Maryland and New
York require an unusual event for there to be an "accident" and these states find
nothing unusual about arguments at work that result in disability. However, even
these states found that worry and anxiety over performing satisfactorily at work and
keeping up with increased work loads were sufficiently unusual to qualify as "acci-
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tween the reaction and the physical harm."' The "arising out of the
employment" analysis fulfills this inquiry, while the use of the meaning of' "accident" to grant or deny compensation simply avoids a
determination of causation. : " As a result of Ferguson, Louisiana
courts can now concentrate on deciding whether the injury "arose out
of" and occurred in the "course of the employment," thus permitting
the needed flexibility in their decisions.:7
Ronald R. Gonzales

STATE v. DOUGLAS: JUDICIAL "REVIVAL"

OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL

STATUTE

Defendant, after a trial by jury, was convicted of inciting to riot.'
The trial court denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict,'
citing its lack of authority)' On appeal, the Louisiana supreme court
dents." See, e.g., Matter of Kilmas v. Trans Carib. Air., 10 N.Y.2d 209, 219 N.Y.S.2d
14, 176 N.E.2d 714 (1961); Schecter v. State Ins. Fund., 6 N.Y.2d 506, 190 N.Y.S.2d
656, 160 N.E.2d 901 (1959). See also J. Norman Geipe, Inc. v. Collett, 172 Md. 165,
190 A. 836 (1937).
Other courts have simply denied compensation on a finding that the employment's connection with the injury was not proven. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Goodyear Tire
& Rub. Co., 196 Kan. 613, 412 P.2d 986 (1966); Brundage v. K.L. House Const. Co.,
74 N.M. 613, 396 P.2d 731 (1964); Shea v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 139 Ohio
St. 407, 40 N.E.2d 669 (1942).
On the other hand, some decisions have found the necessary employment connection to grant compensation. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Neal, 124 Ga. App. 750,
186 S.E.2d 346 (1971). These courts have in effect held that the injury "arose out of"
and in the "course of the employment."
:35. Page, Workmens Compensation Law-Reviews of Leading Current Cases, 28
NACCA L.J. 296, 306 (1961-62).
.36. Comment, 70 YALE L.,]. 1129, 1140 (1961).
37. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963
Term- Workmen s Compensation, 24 LA. L. REv. 244, 249-50 (1964).
1. LA. R.S. 14:329.2 (Supp. 1969).
2. LA. CODE CraM. P. art. 778.
3. The trial court was undoubtedly basing its ruling on State v. Hudson, 253 La.
992, 221 So. 2d 484 (1969), and cases following that decision in which Code of Criminal
Procedure article 778 was declared to be of no effect due to its conflict with article XIX,
section 9 of the Louisiana constitution which states in part that "[t]he jury in all
criminal cases shall be the judges of the law and of the facts on the question of guilt
or innocence, having been charged as to the law applicable to the case by the presiding
judge."

